Paco Alvarez: You’ve been reporting on rising geopolitical tensions between the United States and rival superpowers in the Arctic for a few years. How did this dynamic initially get on your radar?
Adam Federman: I really started to focus my reporting on Alaska during the first Trump administration, and initially I was looking primarily at oil and gas development on the North Slope, which is a highly strategic region for the United States. It’s our Arctic coastline, remnants of Cold War-era infrastructure still dot that part of Alaska. And it was kind of the beginning of a renewed interest in Arctic geopolitics. So while it wasn’t the focus of my reporting during the first Trump administration, it was starting to bubble up and you had larger trends overlapping with what was happening domestically, which primarily was Russian and Chinese interest in asserting their own power and dominance in the region. So it was in the back of my mind and then as I continued to report in Alaska, it became clear that this was going to be a feature of American foreign policy moving forward regardless of whether you had a Democrat or Republican in the White House.
Alvarez: And why has the United States put so many resources into securing the Arctic, including in places like Greenland and Alaska?
Federman: Well, I think in some ways, the United States has been late to the game and we’re trying to catch up, especially to Russia, which has, I think, over 40 icebreakers, for example, while the United States has at best three, two of which I think are out of commission. I think part of what has happened is that the long period of relative stability that followed the end of the Cold War, which was a big part of Arctic politics, they call it Arctic exceptionalism, the idea that the region was somehow outside of the conflicts that had afflicted other parts of the world. And the United States, as sort of the world’s lone superpower, didn’t really prioritize building up its defenses and developing resources in the Arctic during that period. Whereas Russia has always viewed the Arctic as kind of its backyard and as a potential zone of primarily economic development, particularly with shipping lanes.
So I think over time though, it became clear, particularly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, that the Arctic was no longer this place of relative peace and stability. And that’s when you saw renewed interest in military bases in Greenland. It’s become a huge part of Trump’s second term, but even during his first term he talked about buying the island. And then during the Biden administration, you saw continued investment in development and sort of US soft power in Greenland. We opened our consulate in Nuuk, the capital of Greenland in 2020, and have continued to kind of expand our footprint there slowly. But it’s clear that this is part of a larger geopolitical contest between the United Russia and China.
Alvarez: You were just mentioning it, but there’s been a lot of attention on the Trump administration’s policies towards the Arctic, including the president’s attempts at annexing Greenland. But your reporting has shown that there’s a lot of continuity of policy between different administrations. How has U.S. Arctic policy changed or stayed the same between Biden and Trump?
Federman: Yeah, I think honestly there’s probably more continuity than there is change between the administrations. I think that the biggest shift is really in tone. And of course, Trump’s belligerent approach to politics in Greenland has caught a lot of people off guard. But in the end, the agreement that the United States reached with Denmark and Greenland is essentially a continuation of Biden era policy and the agreement has been in place since 1951. And it largely revolves around the ability of the United States to expand its military presence there in Greenland and also access to resources, particularly minerals and other commodities. At the moment there is essentially a ban on new offshore oil and gas development in and around Greenland, but that could potentially change. There’s an interest in developing commercial fisheries both off the coast of Greenland and U.S. Waters in Alaska. But I think that one byproduct of the Trump administration’s policy vis-a-vis agreement is that there’s now a lot of mistrust and questions about U.S. commitment to its allies. And this extends, of course, to NATO, but it’ll be interesting to see how much time and energy Trump devotes to Greenland over the next two years and sort of what kind of posture the United States takes when he leaves office in 2028.
Alvarez: So shifting gears to your newest investigation with Grist – in it, you look at the increasing militarization of Kodiak, an island in Alaska. What makes Kodiaks so attracted to military planners? And what is the government trying to do there?
Federman: Yeah, I mean, it’s been kind of a sleeper story in many ways. I think there are two things about Kodiak that make it attractive to military planners. The first is that it has a spaceport, the Pacific Spaceport Complex, which is operated by the state, the Alaska Aerospace Corporation, which can launch missiles. And it’s one of a handful of launch facilities in the United States that does both defense-related contracting and also commercial launches. So there’s that. And of course, with interest in building up U.S. Missile Defense and Golden Dome, Kodiak has emerged as a player in that context.
It also has the largest Coast Guard base in the Arctic. And the Coast Guard has said that it’s planning to base two new polar icebreakers there in the next few years. And in addition to the Coast guard base and the launch facility, there’s also a Navy SEAL cold weather training base, which in my reporting, I learned that they have been developing, building, constructing something on that base over the course of the last year, which the Navy has not teally been very public about. There were rumors in Kodiak that maybe they were building a data center. That turned out not to be true. And in my reporting, the Navy only told us that they were constructing an “operational facility,” that a contract had been awarded, but you know there’s no other public information. So it’s a kind of a hub of military activity and of course its location is highly strategic as kind of the base of operations for US activity in the Bering Sea and the Aleutian Islands, which is this chain of over a hundred islands that extends out into the Baring Sea and has been a strategic asset for the United States, really going back to the Second World War.
Alvarez: Something you bring up in your article is how some of these plans fit into the Golden Dome project that Trump has been touting. What do we know about the Golden Dome project, and how does it fit into the Trump administration’s plans in Alaska?
Federman: Yeah. Well, it’s provided a big push financially, I think, for some of this development. I mean, the reality is that we don’t know that much about the specifics of Golden Dome. We sort of have a broad sense of what the Trump administration and the military is trying to achieve, but how they execute that, obviously, is a big question. And there’s a huge amount of money being funneled into creating this kind of missile defense shield and some of that money is making its way to Alaska and to these launch facilities–the Spaceport in Kodiak and there’s another launch facility north of Fairbanks called the Poker Flat Test Range, which is part of the University of Alaska Fairbanks. They have a partnership now with the spaceport to expand the number of launches that they conduct annually. And they’ve been very clear about the fact that Golden Dome is driving much of this investment. And so I think there’s little doubt that we’ll see significantly more activity both in Kodiak and elsewhere in Alaska. And there’s also talk of developing a new launch site on the North Slope as well.
Alvarez: And how do people on the ground in Kodiak feel about the changes coming to their island?
Federman: I think opinions are mixed. There’s definitely support for economic benefits that might come with renewed investment in military activities on the island. I mean, the mayor who I interviewed for the story was especially interested in the development of the Coast Guard base and three to five hundred new employees coming into Kodiak and how that will be kind of a boost to the island’s economy. I mean, it’s a big island, but with a relatively small population. It’s one of the largest fishing ports in Alaska. So the economy kind of revolves around that, but there’s not a lot of other stuff going on other than tourism. So there’s definitely interest, I think, in what’s happening.
But there’s also a lot fear and concern about what the environmental impacts will be and what the impacts to the community will be. One of the things that I wasn’t aware of until I started doing the reporting for the story was that Kodiak provides most of its own energy, and it comes from renewable sources, hydro and wind, but they’re basically at capacity. So adding for example, whatever the Navy is constructing to polar icebreakers when they are in port and relying on the grid, and then the launch facility, the island’s clearly going to exceed its energy capacity. And there are questions about what that means, prices for residents when they have to rely on diesel. The spaceport, the launch facility itself has a very mixed track record with many failed launches that have led to environmental and soil contamination. And then I would just add that one of the biggest concerns is access because there’s only one road that goes out to the launch facility and it’s also a popular area for hiking and beaches. Whenever they conduct these launches they usually shut that road down so I think residents, they’re kind of watching you know where all of this development kind of proceeds.
Alvarez: And my last question, as you’ve highlighted, the Arctic is going to remain at the center of military, environmental, and geopolitical debates going forward. And I know you’re going to be continuing to report on the region. Are there any particular issues that you’re looking out for in the coming year?
Federman: Yeah, I mean, I’m especially interested in the Bering Sea region because of the shared boundary with Russia, the proximity of Alaska and eastern Russia and the increased activity in that part of the world, both military and economic, with more and more shipping traffic coming through the Bering Strait, joint military exercises with Russia and China and then the United States and its allies, including Canada, and just really sort of how the ecosystem and geopolitical dynamics are transforming in real time, particularly as it impacts that body of water and the Arctic Ocean. So that’s what I’m keeping my eye on at the moment.